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Currency substitution (CS) and financial adaptation are in general believed to increase the
equilibrium rate of inflation. This result derives from a setup in which the government finances
a certain amount of real resources through money printing and where CS reduces the base of the
inflation tax. This paper shows this intuition wrong for those situations where the hyperinflation
is expectations-driven. Incorporating CS in an Obstfeld-Rogoff (1983) framework I show reduces
the inflation rates along the hyperinflationary equilibrium. The intuition is simple: ifagents have
an easy way of substituting away from domestic currency then the required inflation rates to
sustain a path where real balances disappears is necessarily lower. The implications of the model
are then tested empirically.
Federico Sturzenegger
Department of Economics
University of California, Los Angeles
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90024-1477
and NBER1 Introduction
Several countrieshave experienced monetarysystems in which two currencies issued by the
same government serve as legal tender at the same time. The best known cases are those
of the Soviet Union between November 1922 and March 1924 and Hungary immediately
after World War II. In the Soviet Union, depreciating Soviet rubles circulated side by side
with the stable chervonets. In Hungary, the tax pengö, an indexed currency, was used as
a means of payment together with the regular pengö. But the experience with indexed
currencies belongs not only to history. Beginning in August 1990, the new córdoba is
circulating together with the gold córdoba in Nicaragua and starting in January 1992,
Ukranian coupons go side by side with Soviet rubles.'
During the 1980s, Latin America has experienced an increase in the phenomenon of
dollarization by which US dollars become used for transactions purposes. The process of
dollarization is similar to that of introducing an indexed currency, as it also provides an
alternative means of transacting. The main difference between the establishment of indexed
currencies and dollarization lies in the financing of the monetary stock. The process of
dollarization entails the need to run current account surpluses in order to "purchase" the
stock of monetary balances.
Usually, in the dual currencies experiences, one of the two currencies maintained stable
parity, while the other depreciated very quickly. The conventional wisdom is that it is the
introduction of a stable currency that it accelerates the rate of depreciation of the original
one.2 The argument is that introducing a second currency decreases the demand for the old
'Otherexamples are the issue ci provincial currency in Argentina in the 1980s and the issues of private
money during the German hyperinRation, which seems to have amounted to aboutsixtimes the official
money supply. See Keller (1958).
2Tcseethis approach applied to the Hungarian experience, see Bomberger and Makinen (1980) and
Imoney. The excess supply of currency increases the inflation rate as people try to reduce
their holdings of currency.
This paper tries to challenge this interpretation on both theoretical and empirical
grounds. First, I develop a theoretical model in which the inflation rate is a bubble on
the price level. My basic framework fotlows previous work by Sidrauski (1967) on mod.
els of money in the utility function and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) for its extension to
hyperinflations. I show that if an alternative monetary asset is introduced, the rate at
which inflation accelerates declines. Although initially, the rate of inflation may increase or
decrease, depending upon how strong a decline in monetary balances is induced by the cur-
rency substitution process, the rate of inflaLion under currency substitution will eventually
be smaller than that without currency substitution along the hyperinflation path.
I then test the prediction of the model for two historical episodes. First, I consider the
case of the introduction of indexed currency in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Second, I
discuss the case of dollarization in the Argentine hyperinflations of 1989 and 1990. Both
experiences are shown to be consistent with my model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic Obstfeld-Rogoff frame-
work. Section 3 derives the appropriate properties of a utility function that includes two
monies in its argument. Section 4 presents a model with two fiat currencies. Section 5
discusses the empirical testing of the model. Finally, Section 6 contains some policy and
welfare implications.
(1983), Kaldor (1946a) and (194Gb), and Nogaro (1948).
22 The Basic Framework





where Ct IS the agent's consumption in peziod t,mis his holding of real monetary
balances, y is the agent's fixed endowment, lrc is the inflation rate, and x isgovernment
transfers. The first-order conditions for this problem are
u(c,rn) =A, (3)
dA/dt=+ r —Um(C, m)/A, (4)
limAe_ötmg= 0, (5)




3where c is the rate of growth of the nominal stock ofmoney.
Substitute equations (6) and (7) into (2) to obtain the equilibrium level ofconsumption,
Ct =y.Ill assume that the utility function is separable in consumption and realmoney
balances, the fact that c =y(where y is constant) implies that the marginal utility of
consumption must be constant, or that .A= o. Ican therefore normalize c such that
A == 1.Equation (4) then becomes
(8)
So, substituting (6) into (8) gives
=(5+ 1)m —um(m)m. (9)
Equation (9) is a differential equation in in. By taking the derivative with respect to
in near the steady state (urnmm> 0),1 immediately get that the equation is unstable.
This ties down the price level by determining a unique steady state level of realmoney
balances. But the steady state is not the unique equilibrium. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983)
have shown that in this model, while hyperdeflations can be ruled out (because they violate
the transversality condition), the same is not true of hyperinflations. As long as
lim mu_(m) =0, (10) —0
a rational hyperinfiation may take place even with constant money growth.
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of equation (9). The full line corresponds to the case
in which condition (10) is satisfied. A is the steady state. At A, Urn =5+ C =6+ 1T,
which is the traditional money demand obtained in these models. The hyperdeflationary
4solutions are located totherightof the steady state and generate an unbounded growth of
real monetary balances.
The solutions to the left of the steady state generate a fall in realmoney and therefore
correspond to hyperinflationary paths. Given that for these paths, th=0 when m = 0, the
origin is an alternative steady state and corresponds to a nonmonetary equilibrium.





This case is represented by the dashed line in Figure 1. Aisstill a steady state, and the
hyperinfiationary paths are still to the left of A.Onthe hyperinfiationary solution path
the economy eventually reaches point B, at which point money holdings become negative








•1It is interesting to note that the assumption that eliminateshyperinflations impli that
money has to be essential, in the sense that its marginal utility must increase laster than
the rate at whichmoneybalances converge to zero. In particularurn —.is a necessary
condition to rule out hyperinflations. This condition is likely to be false whenalternative
currencies are available, making it more difficult to rule out hyperinflations in thosesettings.
3 The Properties of the Utility Function
To extend the previous setup to one in whichcurrency substitution occurs, it is important to
characterize the proper utility function to be used. This isparticularly important because
we know from previous literature that the results depend critically on theassumptions on
the cross-partial derivatives between the two monetary assets. Liviatan(1981) showed that
using traditional utility functions with positive cross partials, i.e. in whichUm1m2>0,
generated results that were counter intuitive.3
While the consensus in the literature is that the appropriate utility function shouldbe
characterized by negative cross partials (i.e.,u,,,_3 < 0), to date no utility function that
exhibits these properties has been constructed. In thispaper, I proceed to derive such a
utility (unction explicitly from a Baumol.Tobin.l3arro transactions model.
The traditional Baumol.Tobin-Barro setup starts by postulatinga model in which indi-
viduals require monetary holdings to purchase a constant flow ofconsumption, c. If agents
run short of domestic currency then they must incur a cost in order to obtain additional
currency. These costs are usually associated with the costs of going to the bank or the costs
associated with converting illiquid assets intocurrency. Holding domestic currency entails
3Possibte solutions were suggested byCa!vo (1985) and Engel (1989).
6a loss in terms of foregone interest. To reduce the amount of money held, the individualcan
increase the number of conversions from indexed assets to currency. In addition, thismodel
allows the individual to have the option to commit a certain amount of hisassets to be
held as foreign or indexed currency. This renders the interest rate and theliquidity at the
same time but entails a cost associated with transacting through this more sophisticated
transactions mechanism.
For simplicity I will assume that the agent commits to use a certain amount of indexed
currency (in2)eachtime he obtains domestic currency (in1) and that the costs associated
with using this indexed currency are quadratic in in2. The agent minimizes transactions
costs, L, equal to
=
(c2')i+ Nk1 + Nk2m, (12)
where N is the number of conversions or trips to the bank and k1 and k2 are constants
that determine the real cost of both kind of transactions. i is the nominal interest rate.
Total liquidity costs are equal to the foregone interest on domestic currency holdings plus
transactions costs that equal the cost of "going to the bank" plus the cost of operating
through sophisticated financial instruments. Minimization of (12) with respect to N and





7(14) 2m1 + in2
Feenscra (19S6) showed that if we define Cas"gross consumption" ie. as including "net
consumption" (c) and transactions costs, then there is an equivalence between the problem
(1)-(2) defined over c and an analogous intertemporal maximization problem in which the
agent maximizes a utility function that depends only on c subject to a budget constraint
containing a liquidity cost or transactions cost. Myobjectiveis to find the corresponding
utility function that makes these two problems analogous in this extended setup.
From above, I get that
tf='c+kcN+Nk2rn. (15)
Now, to have an appropriate money in the utility function, it must be that V(c, in1, in2) =
u(c), where u(c) is theoriginalutility function of the liquidity cost prob!em. Substituting
for N from (14), I obtain
* Cs
V(c ,rni,m2) = u( 3). (16)
1-'- ________ .- 3m2
2m1+m22m1+m2
In particular, if u(c) = log(c), then the utility function takes the form
ini, in2) = log(c) —log[1 +2 in2+ 2rn3+m2] (17)
i.e., the utility function is separable in both consumption and liquidity services.
Now, consider the properties regarding the relation between both monetary assets given
by equation (17). For V to be well defined, we require that V >0and that Vu <0,where
S= {c, rn1, rn2}. The two conditions are obviously satisfied for c and rn1 as can beseen
by simpledifferentiationof(17). For rn2 Iobtain
DV 1 1+2k2rn2
Dm22rn1+rn2 2rnj+rn2+k1+k2yn>0, (18)
which will only be positive ilk2 is small enough. Equation (18) states that themarginal
benefitfromholding indexed currency which isthesavings of transactions costs, must
exceed the marginal costs induced by using more of this currency.4








(2rn1 + rn2)2(2rn1 + rn2 + k1 + k2rn)2
It is easy to show thatif (18)is satisfied, the right hand side of (19) will also be positive.
Toseethis result, multiply both denominators of (18) by (2m1 + rn2 + Ic1 + k2rn). Notice
that the resulting positive expression is smaller than that in (19), which therefore is positive
as well. This proves that under the necessary conditions for (17) to be a well-defined utility
function, the cross partials between currencies have to be negative.
In what follows, I work with a utility function that satisfies the properties shown for
(17), i.e., separability in both consumption and liquidity services and negative cross partials
for bothmonies.
4The Two Fiat Currency Model
Letthe representative agent model solve the problem (where again I drop time subscripts
when no confusion arises)
'Thesecondorder derivatives are again negative for c' and ri,1 and form2 far small enough k,
9Max V =j [u(c)+ I(mj,m2)Je_Stdt (20)
subject to
(21)
where the utility function satisfies the properties outlined in Section 3.
The agent can accumulate both kinds of monies or consume. His income isa fixed







(in1+ m2)Ae6' =0. (26)
Aho, I get that
nij/m1=a1—r1 (27)
10and
iii2/rn2 =O'2 — 1r2. (28)
Substituting (27) and (28) into the budget constraint (and using conditionsanalogous
to (7) for government transfers in each currency) gives y =cas before. I again normalize in
such a way that A =1.Substituting (23) and (24) into (27) and (28) gives two differential
equations in both real money balances:
ni1 = (a1 +t—u_jrni (29)
and
th2 =(a2+ 6 —um3)m2. (30)
Equations (29) and (30) describe the evolution of a dynamic system in two variables.5
Notice that in the steady state, a1 =r1and a2 =r2and that therefore the relative
money holdings will be a function of the relative nominal interest rates quoted in each
currency. Linearizing this system around the steady state generates a dynamic system with
two positive eigenvalues.6
This system is completely unstable with the unique convergent path being the steady
state. In addition if the condition analogous to (10) is satisfied, the economy presents a
3The slopes ol th, =0and th2 =0are given by LLflLm,/ILTflLrflLandlL,n3m2/1S,n1m.Theconcavity of
u allows me to determine that the equation for fit3= 0has a higher siope in absolute value.
'The trace equals—(m,um,,n,+ m3u,fl,m3) >0indicating the presence of at least one positive root.
Furthermore the determinant has the sign of U,njm1U,n3rn3 — U?7.Lm, whichby coLicavityisassumed to be
positive. This indicates that both roots have the same sign, i.e. positive.
LImultiplicity of equilibria, described by the hyperinflatiori pathsconverging on the single
currency equilibria.
Figure 2: Monetary Dynamics in the Two Fiat Currency Model
LI
A
The phase diagram for the linearized system is given in Figure 2. Points A and Crep-
resent the one-currency equilibria. Along the branch denoted I,m1 suffers a hyperinflation.
Along II, it is in2 that asymptotically disappear. As both variables are jump-variables, the
economy can move to any point along this path (II) and still satisfy the dynamic equations
that describe the evolution of the monetary equilibrium.
It is interesting to do comparative statics on this model under theassumption that we
begin at the steady state without hyperinilation (point A). Suppose I introduce a new
currency, say in2. This moves the equilibrium from point A to point B. Because the cross
marginal utilities are negative, the introduction of in2 induces a decrease in the equilibrium






CSuppose now I increase the rate of money growth for in1. This shifts theru1 =0locus
downwards to rh'1 =0.Thefinalequilibrium entails lower real holdings of in1 andgreater
holdings of in2, i.e.1 a price level jump in terms of the "worsened"currency and a fall of the
price level measured in terms of the "new" or more stable one. The relativeprice level shift
implies lower real holdings of the original money in steady state. Therefore, thesteady state
implications of the model are the expected ones and to some extent work as a Gresham's
Law in reverse: across steady states, good money displaces bad.
Now return to the initial steady state (point A). Assume now that whileone currency is
evolving through a hyperinflationary path, another currency "backed" by thegovernment
is introduced.7 Furthermore, suppose it is in2 that is backed. Inow examine how the
introduction of this second currency affects the dynamicprocess for the initial one, in1
(using the transversality condition) will evolve according to
nti(t)= e(0+ëLmi(mLm,flt
(31)
Forthe hyperinflationary paths we are considering, the coefficient of theexponent is
negative; as we are to the left of the steady state (A in Figure 1), real money holdings
approach zero.
The rate of the depreciation of real money balances is given by the exponent a + 6 —
u1(mi,m2).So, the effect on the rate of decline of monetary balances will be given by
the net effect on the marginal utility of money. There are two effects at work. On the one
hand the increase in holdings of in2 will push the marginal utility downward. On the other
hand, the fall in the holdings of in1 will have the opposite effect. I discuss the net effect
with the help of Figure 3.
'In thiscontext, "backing' means forcing condition (11) toholdin the monetary equilibrium.
13Figure 3 integrates Figures I and 2. The outer equation for th (th1(m2= 0)=0)
is constructed for the case iii which in2 =0and corresponds to that in Figure 1 Now,
consider a point along the hyperinflationary path for currency in1say, point C.Theinner
curve for th1 is constructed for the corresponding value of m2. To know if the inflation
rate of the original currency increases or decreases, we have to see if th/mincreasesor
decreases upon moving to the new equilibrium point. Along a hyperinflationary solution
the initial money balances for in1arebounded below by theamount of real money
balances corresponding to the new equilibrium, and above by in1, the maximum possible
holding of money balances before the introduction of the alternative currency. It can now
be seen from Figure 3 that if the initial monetary balances were abovem, then ih/m (the
slope of the line which starting at the origin goes through a particular point in the th1= 0
curve) increases in absolute value in the transition; therefore from (27) the inflation rate
increases as well. Conversely, if initial money balances are belowm, the rate of inflation
falls.
Irregardless of the initial effect on the level of the inflation rate, if the new currency is a
substitute for original currency in the sense of Section 3, then the rates of inflation required
to sustain the hyperinflation path will be lower than before. Equation (29) implies that the
rate of inflation depends on the value of the marginal utility of money, Urn.Forthe same
holdings of domestic currency, currency substitution lowers the marginal utility of money
thereby reducing the rate of inflation. In addition, the rate of growth of inflation falls as
along the hyperinflation path (I) described in Figure 2, the holdings of the indexed currency
increase. This reduces the marginal utility of money as compared with an equivalent change
in monetary holdings without the possibility of substitutingaway from domestic currency.
A fall in the rate of increase of the inflation rate due to the introduction of a more
14Figure 3: Effects of a Second Currency on Monetary Dynamics
"stabk" currency and a reduction in the inflation rates achieved during the hyperinflation
goes against the conventional wisdom. But, the intuition for this seemingly puzzling result
is rather straightforward. Along the hyperinflationary path (I), people are willing to reduce
monetary balances because they expect the inflation rate to increase in the future. If money
is "essential" in the sense that its marginal utility is very high, then the inflation rate
required to induce people to substitute out of this currency must be very large. If money
losses this "essentiality" property -because a very close substitute develops or becomes







The hypothesis that hyperinilation isa bubble on the price level has been empirically tested
by Floodand Gather (1980), Flood, Garber, and Scott (1984), and Casella (1989). The
last two papers were unable to reject the existence of a bubble on the price level.
In this paper I follow Flood and Garber (1980) and test for bubbles for two historical
episodes. First, I consider the introduction of the chervonets, an indexed currency, in
November 1922 in the Soviet Union. [then consider the two Argentine hyperinfiations of
May-August 1989 and of December-March 1990. The Argentine experiences present a ideal
case studies because an intense process of financial adaptation took place in the short time
span between the two hyperinflations.
The model discussed in this paper generates two predictions. The first is that both
monies are substitutes and that therefore the demand for the original currency falls upon
introduction of the indexed alternative. The second is that bubbles are important in the
hyperinflationary process and that the value of the bubble grows at a smaller rate and
eventually is smaller with currency indexation than without. The first prediction of the
model derives from the negative cross-partial derivative derived in Section 3. 1 tested this by
testing whether that money demand falls when the new currency is introduced or financial
adaptation takes place. The second hypothesis was tested by estimating the value of the
bubble before and after the monetary reform and testing whether the bubblegrows at a
slower rate with currency substitution than without.
To estimate the value of the bubble, I used a variation of the empirical model developed
by Flood and Garber (1980). Their model is a discrete time, partial equilibrium versiOn of
the theoretical model considered in thispaper. Their model also allows for changes in the
16rate of monetarygrowth; since tilerateof money growth is not constant in thereal world,
it must be accounted for in the econometric testing,
Specifically, the model consists of a Cagan money demand function of theform
—p=+aE...i(rt)+ c, (32)
where mj and Ptarethe logs of nominal money balances and the price level. Asusual,
E_ denotes the expectation conditional on the information available at thebeginning of
the period. Finally, Ce 5 a random shock. The money demandsemielasticity, a, is negative.
The rational expectations solution of (32) for the inflation rate is
Et_j(rij)= A00t—E E_1(c1)', (33)
where= > 1and A0 is an arbitrary constant. The term A0€4' corresponds to
the bubble and describes the solution considered in thispaper. The second term in (33)
represents the fundamentals driving the rate of inflation. My model predicts that with
currency substitution, should be smaller and the bubble will grow at a lower rate. A fall
intakes place upon an increase in the absolute value of a. Both predictions of the model
are therefore tied to the behavior of a.
The empirical implementation of the model involved the following steps. First, I tested
for theintegratedness of my variables: the rate of inflation and the real stock ofmoney. I
then computed a money demand function that allows for a change in monetary holdings
at the moment of the introduction of currency indexation. This consisted of testing for an
appropriate cointegrating vector between real money demand and inflation. If my money
demand function cointegrates, then I know that the estimators are superconsistent, ie.,
17converge to the true population moments at a rate laster than the usual TL Unfortunately,
the limiting distribution is nonstandard and skewed to the left. (See Stock (1987).) In
order to obtain consistent estimators of the standard errors, I ran a Stock and Watson
(SW) regression. (See Stock and Watson, (1989).) The SW procedure entails running GLS
on the cointegrating equation and adding the backward and forward lags of all the residuals
of any cointegrating relationship present between the regressors. Alternatively, OLS with
Newey-West corrected standard errors (see Newey and West (1987)) also attain consistency.
As the inflation rate is an 1(1) process in my specilication, the cointegrating vectors that
had to be added to the system are the differences in the inflation rate. In general, three
forward and three backward lags were used.
Once a consistent estimate of the semielasticity of money was obtained, I computed 4)
and estimated, again using the SW procedure, the inflation prediction equation (33). This
enables me to test the significance of the bubble term and to estimate the value of A0.
Finally, I could compute, given the value of 4) and A0, the corresponding bubble for each
hyperinfiation.
Estimation of (32) was done by substituting the actual inflation rate for the expected
value. This would in general introduce an errors in variables problem. In this case, due to
the integratedness of the equation, the error term is asymptotically irrelevant. (See Engle
andGranger(1987)). Therefore, if real money and inflation are in fact cointegrated, my
estimators of the coefficients in equation (32)areconsistent.
185.1 TheSovietHyperinflation
The historyofSovietinflationbeginswiththerestriction of convertibility shortly alter
thebeginning of WorldWar1.During the years until 1921, an important fraction of
government spending was financed by money issue, even though shortly after the revolution,
regulations issued by the People's Commissariat of Finance restricted the circulation of
currency in an attempt to construct a money-free economy. As the economy reverted to
barter, economic activity collapsed, and real money holdings declined sharply. After 1921, a
strong turn in economic policies took place under the "New Economic Policy" program. The
NEP accomplished a wide liberalization of the monetary and financial markets. Inflation
nevertheless continued unabated. The Soviet government increasingly became convinced of
the need of establishing a stable currency. Finally, the issue of the chervonets was agreed
upon. The state bank was responsible for the issue, but it was required to secure up to
no less than one quarter of the sum issued by precious metals and stable foreign currency.
Even though it was not a convertible currency, the value of the chervonets remained stable
during 1923, while the Soviet ruble continued to depreciate at an ever increasing rate.
Initially, chervonets were regarded with distrust but afterwards quickly began to sub-
stitute for old Soviet rubles. Finally, in March 1924 the old Soviet ruble was liquidated by
being exchanged at fixed parity with the chervonets. When the Soviet rubles were with.
drawn from circulation, (on March 10, 1924), each new ruble was exchanged for 50,000,000
prerevolutionary rubles.
I first tested for the integratedness of the money demand variables: the stock of real
monetary balances and the inflation rate. The ADF69 statistics for real monetary balances
'Datawas obtained from Caan(1956), Katrenellenbaum (1925) and Yurovsky (1925).
The subscript in the AD? coefficient indicates the number of tags used in the computation of the
19and inflation equal -1.16 and -0.27, respectively, which when compared with the critical
value of -2.89, does not allow me to reject the hypothesis of integratedness.'°
I next computed the S\V money demand function for the period between August 1919
and April 1924. The estimated equation is
=18.44+ 2.38D —l.?9We—2.26k1D)+ 0.351 —4.44th—.2lChert,(34)
(13.45) (9.19) (—4.54) (—5.60) (9.49) (—9.51)(—7.67)
where tnt is real holdings of Soviet rubles, ir1 is the inilation rate, and I is a time trend.
The dummy D takes a value of one for periods after January 1923. While chervonets were
officially introduced in late November 1922, they only started to circulate in significant
pxantities in January 1923. Both time trends capture the progressive process of financial
adaptation that takes place in high inflation situations. The variable Cher2 measures the
real stock of chervontsi in circulation. The money demand function implied by equation
(29) together with the assumption on the cross-partial derivatives derived in Section 3
suggests that this variable should enter with a negative coefficient. Newey-West corrected
standard errors were used to compute the t-statistics reported.
A standard ADF3 test gave a statistic of -2.94, rejecting the hypothesis of nonstationar-
ity at the 5 percent level. I conclude then that (34) is a cointegrating vector and therefore
that the estimated parameters are consistent to their true population counterparts.
The first hypothesis I set out to test was whether there was a decline in monetary
statistic.
'0See Fuller (1976, Table 8.5.2. second panel) for 100observations.
'1TheNewey-West standard errors allowed for si,c significant covariances,witha dampening factor of .33
inthe corresponding window.
20balances following the introduction of the chervonets. The introduction of the chervonets
appears to have decreased the demand for Soviet rubles directly as measured by the negative
coefficient on the variable Cher. In addition, the elasticity of money demand -the critical
parameter to determine the effects on the bubble- also falls significantly, being equal to -1.79
before the introduction of the indexed currency and -4.05 after the reform. An additional
process of decline in money demand took place through progressive financial adaptation as
captured by the negative time trend.
The consistent estimates of the seinielasticities obtained from (34) allowed me to com-
pute the value of 4. For the pre-chervonets period, 0 = 1.56; after the introduction of the
chervonets, 4 =1.25.The bubble term grows slower under the indexed currency system
than before. In this sense, I have that the rate of inflation required to sustain the bubble
falls as an indexed currency is incorporated.
I next proceeded to test for the relevance of the bubble, by estimating the appropriate
inflation prediction equation (33). Following Flood and Garber (1980), I ran the corre-
sponding SW regression for
7r =5+ + PkCE_k + Aoçót + A1t + V, (35)
which is appropriate as long as an AR(k) model is sufficient to describe the a process.
The two bubbles have the time variables normalized for comparison. I tested for a bubble
(Ao) between August 1922 and November 1922, ie., prior to the introduction of the cher-
vonets, and for a second bubble (.4) between January 1923 until the redemption of the
Soviet rubles in April 1924. The SW regression'2 for (35) gave coefficients equal to 0.0068
12jaddedto the regression the dilterences in the rate of money growth (or which I could not reject the
null of integratedness. In this case I added current and two forward Tags and set k =6.
21for the first bubble and 0.02 for the second. The corresponding t-statistics are 0.58 and
2.90, respectively. From this, I conclude that there was no bubble prior to the introduction
of the chervonets but that one developed shortly thereafter. Computation of the bubble
indicates that it was responsible for about 80 percent of the inflation rate toward the end
of the hyperinflation.'3 The AD!'3 statistic on the residuals of this regression equals -5.54,
clearly rejecting nonstationarity.
My model accounts both for the decline in monetary balances after the introduction
of the indexed currency and for the importance of bubbles in accounting for the hyperin.
fiationary process. Unfortunately, a comparison between the two bubbles is not possible
for this case because prior to the introduction of the chervonets, there was no bubble; the
inflationary process was basically driven by fundamentals. I next analyzed a case in which
there were clearly two hyperinflation episodes to allow for a comparison in the bubble terms.
5.2 The Argentine Hyperinflations
Argentina has along history of inflationary financing. During the lOSOs the rate of inflation
increased substantially, reaching hyperinifationary levels during the period May-August of
1989. During the hyperinflation, extensive financial adaptation took place, and the degree of
dollarization increased substantially. (See Sturzenegger (1991) and Dornbusch, Sturzeneg-
ger and Wolf (1990)). A stabilization program implemented in August 1989 stabilized the
economy until December. After mid.December, inflation increased once again and remained
high until March.
The two Argentine hyperinfiations were the conclusion of decades of excessive reliance
'3Mymethodologyallowedme test brbubbles for any arbitrary period. If alternative datesare tried for
thetime span of thebubble,similar results obtain.
22on seigniorage to finance government spending. What makes these experiences extremely
relevant for the model at hand is the deepening of financial adaptation during the first
hyperinflation. The second hyperinfiation therefore took place with many more alternative
monetary assets already in place and therefore allowed to test the predictions of the model.
At an informal level, one could argue in favor of my model by noticing that inflation
reached 200 percent during the first hyperinflation but only 100percentduring the second.
In both cases, the reduction in real monetary holding was equivalent.'4 This suggests that
the rate of inflation required to reduce monetary holdings decreased substantially in the
short time span between the two hyperinflations.
More formally, I first tested for the integratedness of real money and the inflation rate.t5
The ADF6 statistics for real monetary balances and inflation equal 0.44 and -1.14, which
when compared with the critical value of -2.89 do not allow rejection of the hypothesis of
integratedness.'6 I then estimated the SW money demand equation, obtaining
inc =6.45+ 0.67D —0.S2irc—0.73(irtDj)
—.017t, (36)
(145.33) (9.28) (—5.34) (—6.10) (—7.64)
where mc is real holdings of Argentine australes, lrg is the inflation rate, and t is a time
trend. The dummy D takes a value of one for periods after July 1989, i.e., after the end
of the first hyperinflation. The time trend captures the progressive process of financial
"The troughin the level of real money holdings attained a vatue of 4.93 for the firsthyperinfiation and
of 4.90 for the seconi This levet corresponds to a decline of 18 percent from the previous peak for the first
hyperinflation and a falt of 15 percent from the previous peak for the second hyperinflation.
Thedatawas obtained from Tadicadores de Coyuntura, FIEL, Bs. As., several issues.
16See Fulter (1976,Table 8.5.2. secondpanet) for 100 observations.
23adaptation that takes place in high inflation situations.
Again, for the parameters of the equation to converge to the true population moments,
we equation (36) must be a cointegration equation. A standard ADF3 test gave a statistic
of -2.95, rejecting the hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 5 percent level. I conclude then
that (36) is a cointegrating vector and that the parameters converge to the true population
moments.
The first hypothesis I wanted to test was whether there was a decline in monetary
balances after the first hyperinfiation. Notice that, from (36), the semielasticity of money
demand equals -.82 before the introduction of the indexed currency and -1.65 after the
reform. Also an additional process of decline in money demand took place through a
progressive financial adaptation, as captured by the negative time trend.
The consistent estimates of the semielasticities obtained from (36) allowed me to com-
pute the value of .Beforethe first hyperinflation, =2.22;after, =1.61.Again, the
rate of growth of inflation is much smaller under currency substitution.
I estimated (35) the inflation prediction equation, using the same methodology as I
described for the previous example. I allowed for bubbles between March and July 1989
and between November 1989 and March 1990. Both bubbles appear strongly significant
with coefficients (t.statistics) of .026 (15.10) and -059 (9.16) for the first and second hy-
perinfiation, respectively. From the t-statistics we conclude that bubbles are statistically
significant components of an explanation of Argentine hyperinflations. Again, I tested for
cointegratedness of this regression using an ADF3 test. I got a statistic of -3.62, which
easily rejects the null of nonstationarity.
Table 1 shows the inflation rate and the bubble for the two Argentine hyperinfiatioris.
The second bubble is the larger initially but grows more slowly as the rate of inflation
24Table 1: Bubbles in the Argentine Ilyperinfiations
First llyper Second Hyper
DateInflationBubbleDate InflationBubble
1989:3 .17 .06 1989:11 .07 .10
1989:4 33 .12 1989:12 .40 .16
1989:5 .78 .29 1990:1 .79 .26
1989:6 1.14 .63 1990:2 .62 .44
1989:7 1.97 1.41 1990:3 .96 .72
required to induce people to hold less money is reduced by the process of financial adap-
tation, dollarization, or introduction of currency indexation.
bubble reaches a smaller value than the corresponding one for
is fully consistent with the predictions of the model.
6 Conclusions
The second hyperinflation
the first hyperinflatiort, this
This paper studied the implications of introducing an "indexed" or "backed"currency on
the monetary equilibrium of an economy with fiatcurrency. To analyze this question, I
constructed a model with a utility function with two currencies. I showed that such util-
ity function will exhibit negative cross-partial between the two monies. Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, I found that in that in a rational expectations hyperinfiationary so-
lution in which both monetary assets are substitutes, the introduction of a backedcurrency
reduces the rate of depreciation of the original money along the hyperinfiation path.
The introduction of the indexed currency induces a process of currency substitution
25across steady states. Upon introduction of the second currency, a price leveljump takes
place for the original one, reducing its real value. This substitution effect has been stressed
in the previous literature. What this paper shows is that it is incorrect to infer fromthis
that the equilibrium rate of inflation of the originalcurrency should increase. On the
contrary, by lowering the marginal utility of the existing currency, the indexedcurrency
reduces the inflation rate required to sustain a path with declining realmonetary holdings
of the original currency. In my model, with fixed money growth, this will result in a smaller
rate of growth of inflation.
Additionally if the original currency is experiencing a hyperinflation at the time the
new currency is introduced, then the shift to the backed currency occurs gradually. In the
long run, the whole system shills in the long run to the better currency. In this model, we
get a Gresham's Law in reverse: goodmoney displaces bad.
Themodel is then tested empirically for the experiences of Soviet Union during the
early 1920s and for Argentina during the late lOSOs. The evidence shows an increase in the
semielasticity of money demand consistent with the implications of the model. I showed
that the bubble grows at a smaller rate when two currencies exist, validating the model's
implication that the rate of inflation required to sustain the hyperinilationary equilibrium
is smaller under the presence of an alternative currency.
The effects on welfare can be analyzed from the first order conditions for the agent's
maximization problem. The utility of the representative agent is maximized at the point
at which the marginal utilities of both currencies equal zero, i.e., where a1 =a2=—6
(at the Friedman rule solution). A hyperinflation equilibrium is extremely costly in terms
of welfare because it increases the nominal interest rate, thereby inducing people to save
on cash holdings. The introduction of the indexed currency, presumably with a lower
26c, improves upon the hyperinflatjonaz-y equilibrium with
one currency by providingan
alternate currency that more closely satisfies theFriedman rule. This is not only because
it provides a channel by which people can substitutetheir demand to acurrency with a
lower "relative price" but also because the rate of inflationof the original currencymay
actually decrease as well. Contrary to the results ofsome researchers who have cautioned
about the risks of financial adaptation because of its
exacerbating inflationary effects (see,
for example, De Gregorlo (1991) and Dornbusch andReynoso (1939)), the results of this
study wholly support the introduction of an indexedcurrency.
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